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Latent Classes within the Ameri-
can Electorate: A Reinterpreta-
tion of the Pew Center Typology 
Solon Simmons 
George Mason University 
James R. Simmons 
University of Wisconsin 
In this paper we develop a new typology of the American electorate 
that takes the popularly recogn.ized Pew Research Center typology as a 
point of departure. In place of the ad hoc clustering algorithms used to 
develop that typology, we use probability-based method often called 
Latent Class or Latent Profile Analysis to produce a new classification. 
This model-based approach improves on the existing clustering tech-
niques and produces more reliable estimates of underlying group struc-
tures. We apply the technique to the Political Typology survey 
conducted by the Pew Center in 1999 and discover eight political types 
in that year. These eight types are projected into a two-dimension atti-
tude space via multidimensional scaling techniques to reveal one issue 
dimension pitting domestic state power against military state power 
and the other pitting conservative cultural positions against system 
integrity positions . 
There is a natural tension between concepts of quality and quantity. In the history of recent social science, this ten-sion has played out in internecine squabbles between re-
searchers dedicated to qualitative research and those dedicated to 
quantitative research. The key explanatory concept of the qua-
litative researcher has long been the type or category, while that-
for the quantitative researcher has long been the variable or trait. 
Reasons for this are partly sociological and partly logical. There 
is a verisimilitude, a natural and obvious descriptive utility, to a 
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well-developed typology that is absent from a similarly compe-
tent estimation of a system of random variables. On the other 
hand a typology is often static and lacks the precision that one 
finds in statistical models of what the Sociologist Andrew Abbot 
following Herbert Blumer calls the "variables paradigm" (Abbott 
1997).The advantages of ready interpretation has made a typo-
logical approach attractive to social theorists and has allowed 
typologies to capture the public imagination, 1 but the difficultly 
in quantifying types has made typology more of an exercise for 
the general intellectual than for the social scientist. 
Over the past fifteen years, researchers at the Pew Center for 
the People and the Press have been developing a survey based 
political typology using a combination of factor analysis and 
clustering methods (Kohut 1999). This typology has been quite 
popular in various settings because it combines the natural ap-
peal of a theory of types with the scientific authority of large-
scale survey research and complicated statistical techniques. 
While the methods employed to produce the typology are com-
petent and justified by the dominant approaches to multivariate 
statistics, such clustering methods are well known to produce 
unstable groupings with unknown theoretical status. Traditional 
clustering is as much art as science. 
As early as 1950 (Lazarsfeld 1950; Lazarsfeld and Henry 
1968), Paul Lazarsfeld introduced a way of thinking about types 
as latent classes that could be derived from manifest or observa-
ble survey items. Since then these methods have been developed 
and rendered practical for estimation by Goodman, Clogg, Ha-
genaars and others (Goodman 1974; Clogg 1981; Hagenaars and 
1 Think only of the Myers-Briggs personality classification . This system is currently used 
throughout industry in ways that the better studied "big five" system of latent traits prob-
ably will never be. 
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
LA TENT CLASSES WITHIN THE AMERICAN ELECTORATE 111 
Halman 1989). Most recently, convenient and powerful estima-
tion programs have been developed by Jeroen Vermunt and 
Bengt Muthen (Muthen 2002; Vermunt and Magidson 2002). In 
its current form, Lazarsfeld's Latent Structure analysis has 
evolved to incorporate many desirable specification options that 
make it a reasonable alternative to tl1e clustering techniques em-
ployed in the Pew Political Typology. In particular, the Latent 
Class techniques make it possible to generate attitude profiles 
based on explicit models of the response items instead of relying 
on the somewhat ad hoc and unreliable features of traditional 
cluster methods, which employ similarities data and loosely jus-
tified algorithms, each of which is capable of producing a differ-
ent agglomeration. 
In this paper we first motivate the discussion by suggesting 
why an empirical social typology is desirable and then go on to 
develop a latent class/latent profile model of the Political Typol-
ogy data collected by the center in its most recent thorough spe-
cification of the typology in 1999.2 After developing the new 
typology we highlight some of the attractive properties of the 
latent class/latent profile solution as it is developed here and 
provide a theoretical interpretation of the findings. As part of this 
interpretation we project the classes into a two dimensional 
space via multidimensional scaling techniques which helps to 
imagine potential attitudinal coalitions of voters. 
2 The data for 1999 are attractive because this is the last major revision of the typology 
produced by the center and more items are offered for examination in I 999 than are in 
subsequent studies. In order to facilitate comparisons we have estimated a similar model 
for the political typology survey of 2000 as well. There are notable limitations for the 
2000 data, which utilize a more restricted set of attitude items and do not contain demo-
graphic data for non-registered voters. 
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LATENT CLASS TYPOLOGIES 
A latent class model is an explicit model of the data structure 
just as regression and factor analysis type models are. The model 
imposes a set of assumptions onto the distributions of the ob-
servable variables that be tested against the actual data. Rather 
than employing algorithms of unknowable conceptual status, the 
latent class models are estimated as are other statistical models. 
Parameters can be constrained manually which allows the re-
searcher to control the definition of the type across groups and 
time. If the older definition does not fit the data well on the bases 
of probability theory, the older definition can be said to be 
invalid. In short the latent class approach allows for classifica-
tion according to the legitimated approaches of statistical model 
building. 
In Figure 1, a standard latent class model is represented. At 
the core of the latent class model is the insight of the classic fac-
tor model. The variable X in Figure 1 is a discrete an unobserva-
ble variable with an unknown number of nominal values. A set of 
observed indicators are related to one another through their asso-
ciation with the unobserved variable X, here called a latent class 
variable. As in the classic factor model, any association between 
the manifest variables is explained by this underlying discrete 
variable. While this takes the form of zero residual correlation 
between indicators in the factor model, it talces the form of con-
ditional independence in the latent class model. In the standard 
latent class model the indicators A, B, C, D are understood to be 
observed and measured on a nominal or unordered scale. 
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Figure 1 
A 
B 
C 
D 
What one actually observes in a data set are four manifest 
variables, A, B, C, D. The model is devised in such a way that 
the underlying unobserved variable is treated much the same 
way as are the observed variables. The basic justification of the 
method can be represented by considering the following proba-
bility statement of the process in Figure 1: 
In this representation the T classes of the discrete variable are not 
observed, but function as would any observed variable. However 
the X variable is unique in the model because, for example, 
rr(Ai I Xe)= rr(Ai I Bj,Xc), This condition is called local inde-
pendence and implies that A and B are independent conditional 
on X. In common English, this means that any association be-
tween the observed variables is "explained " by their common 
class membership much like observed correlations are explained 
by an underlying continuous trait in classic factor analysis . 
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From this basic insight many more complicated models have 
been formulated. Among the complications is the inclusion of 
ordered or continuous indicator variables. This version of the 
model is often called latent profile analysis. In addition, cova-
riates can be added to the model that are understood as causes of 
group membership. Tilis kind of specification follows the MIMC 
specification of latent trait models devised for the LISREL pro-
gram. The resulting models provide a better fit for the data and 
help in the identification of the unobserved types. 
DATA AND MODEL STRATEGY 
Beginning in 1987, the Pew Center began its typology study, 
which continues to this day. The core questions used for the 
study have been fairly stable over time and appear in Appendix A 
below . In October 1999 there were 26 questions included that 
corresponded to 13 underlying concepts developed for the study. 
The original Pew study discovered eight underlying continuous 
traits lying bellind these indicators and nine latent types plus one 
for those not registered lying behind these traits. They discov-
ered these types using k-means cluster methods. After complet-
ing the process, the nine types were given names to capture the 
flavor of members who had been assigned to these categories. 
We propose to reclassify these respondents using a latent profile 
analysis with covariates. 
The basic outline of the strategy is as follows. First we chose 
to examine only 24 of the 26 items of the question battery. The 
reason for tins was that the last two questions, although impor-
tant, were too timely or contextual to be considered stable fea-
tures of an underlying type of person. A person may well run out 
of money, while not changing his or her attitude structure. In or-
der to use tl1e questions as variables a scaling strategy was ne-
cessary. For each question one of two opposing options was 
selected as preferred. Directly afterward the respondent was 
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asked if they felt strongly about this choice or not. The questions 
were rotated so that the default "Left" position was not always 
presented first and rotated too so that question order would not 
bias the results. For all 24 indicators, we have scored the strong 
"Right" position as a 5, the moderate-right position as a 4, the 
strong left position as a 1, and the moderate left position a 2. If 
neither or both was volunteered, this was scored as 3.3 This pro-
cedure produced 24 five point scales. 
From these scales we next created a simple sum of scores for 
the remaining 12 concepts, resulting in 12 basic indicators of 
core attitudes with values ranging from 2 to 10. This Sum-score 
method was necessary because we wished to exploit the distinct-
ness of the 12 concepts by including them in the model as indica-
tor variables. Including the 24 indicators separately was 
implausible given the nature of the model because there are 
strong correlations between the pairs of indicators that would not 
be explained away by the model; the local independence as-
sumption would never fit the data well if we did not collapse 
each of the two cognate variables into a single indicator. 4 We 
have used the following names for the 12 attitudes used as indi-
' The "don 't know"f' refusal'' option has also been included as a 3. This does not substan-
tially alter the model estimation and allows for scoring of the maximum number of res-
pondents. 
' It would also have been possible to draw factor score estimates from 12 distinct factor 
analyses for the 24 indicators. This would have been problematic because the factor 
model with two indicators is under-identified. This means that assumptions about the 
residual variances and loadings must be made that effectively limit the information one 
can draw from the model to that one can draw from a simple sum of scores. We also 
chose not to extract the eight factors from the 24 indicators that result from such an anal-
ysis of the indicators. Predicted values for these eight factors could have served as our 
indicators , but we would then lose the ready interpretations that were possible with the 
strategy pursued here. Such an analysis would be seen through a glass darkly twice over. 
A final option was suggested by Jeroen Vermunt. He suggested that we could perform the 
analysis with the 24 indictors while relaxing the local independence assumption between 
the similar pairs of indicators. This option will have to wait for another paper. 
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cators in the study: Federal Authority, Poverty, Racial Discrimi-
nation, World Community, Military, Power, Fair Opportunity, 
Corporate Power, Beltway Insiders, The Environment, National 
Optimism, Cultural Orthodoxy, Religion. These twelve indica-
tors then serve as the elements of the profiles generated in this 
analysis. The types represent distinct combinations of these 
twelve stances and effectively constitute potential structures of 
feeling. Taking the model seriously, we must assume that the 
resulting profiles are stable states which demonstrate empirical 
systems of constraint among the basic attitudes measured here. 
In its strongest form, this means that a change in any one of the 
12 attitudes implies corresponding changes in at least some of 
the remaining eleven. 
The latent profile models were estimated using the program 
LatentGold 3.0. This_ program builds on the log-linear modeling 
framework and makes several features of estimation much more 
simple than was possible with earlier programs. Among the most 
important advances for purposes of this analysis were the inclu-
sion of relevant background variables as covariates and the 
treatment of indicator variables as ordinal rather than as nominal 
or continuous. The background variables included in the estima-
tion were party (3 category), race (2 category), Latino (2 catego-
ry), gender (2 category), registered (2 category), south (2 
category), urbanicity (4 category), income, education, and age 
(all continuous). The resulting models then incorporate informa-
tion about how the types would differ in incidence across these 
background characteristics.5 
5 There is some debate about how to interpret the resulting models. While the implied 
structure suggests that the types are "regressed" on the background variables, the inter-
pretation we take is that the background variables help in the estimation of the types. This 
may simply result from the advantages of over identification that the background va-
riables provide (see Lubke and Muthen 2003). 
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RESULTS 
Over the course of many estimations we have discovered 
that the best fit to the data is an eight class model that includes 
all of the background covariates described above. In each case, 
the model with fewer or more classes or without any of the 
background variables resulted in a poorer fit to the data. In order 
to make this claim we have relied on likelihood ratio tests as well 
as the Bayesian model selection indictor called BIC (Raftery 
1995). This second method of model selection incorporates in-
formation about model uncertainty that is often ignored in stan-
dard statistical analysis. Effectively BIC helps to standardize the 
fit statistics that are drawn from the large number of models that 
a researcher is likely to produce in the course of testing many 
rival hypotheses on observational data. The model with the low-
est BIC score is likely to fit the data better than all of the others 
with higher BIC scores. A sample of the test results are shown in 
Table 1. 
Table 1 
Model 1 Model2 Model3 
Model 7-Cluster 8-Cluster 9-Cluster 
LL -85629.67 -85506 .32 -85423.00 
BIC(LL) 173442.10 173426.90 173491.80 
Npar 264. 292. 320 . 
L2 171003.5 170756.8 170590.2 
Df l.08E + 15 l.08E + 15 l.08E+l5 
p-value I. I. I. 
Class Error 0.26 0.29 0.29 
As is clear in the table, the eight class model fits better than ei-
ther the seven or nine class model. Adding a new class introduc-
es 28 new parameters and improves the absolute fit of the model. 
The likelihood ratio test and BIC help to differentiate between a 
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model that fails to improve the fit of the model enough to justify 
the estimation of the extra parameters. 
In addition to the model fit statistics presented in Table 1, the 
latent class model provides a means for the estimation of the re-
liability of the latent classes. The justification for this procedure 
is simple. Class assignment in this model is based on model 
posterior probability. That is to say that each respondent is as-
signed to the class for which the estimated posterior probability 
( derived from the model estimates) is highest. In all cases these 
probabilities fall between zero and one and in some cases the 
largest posterior probability can be quite low in absolute terms. 
Reliability estimates can then be generated by talcing the average 
of these posterior probabilities for members of each class or 
type. These data can be read off the trace of a proximity matrix 
created by crossing the average posterior probability with the 
estimated modal class mem-
bership. These estimates 
appear in Table 2. The latent 
class names have been in-
cluded in the table, and will 
be justified later in the pa-
per. 
These probabilities seem 
to be quite high in general. 
While there is no way to 
compare them directly with 
the sort of reliability meas-
ures that accompany most 
Table 2 
Reliability Estimates 
Right-Wing Populists 
Great Society Liberals 
Liberal Drifters 
Opportunity Liberals 
Business Class 
Religious Right 
Hard Right 
Progressives 
Reliability 
0.70 
0.74 
0.71 
0.68 
0.71 
0.72 
0.79 
0.81 
scales , the results compare favorably with general standards of 
reliability in the current factor analysis and scaling literatures.6 
• An example is Cronbach' s alpha, in which values of 0.8 or over are considered to be 
excellent scales. 
THE J OU RNAL OF POLI TI CAL SCIENCE 
LATENT CLASSES WITHIN THE AME RICAN ELE CTORATE 119 
THE TYPES DESCRIBED 
Once the models are estimated, it is a simple matter to pro-
duce graphical profiles of the characteristics of the discovered 
types. These profiles are the basis of substantive interpretation of 
the types and are the source of whatever names the researcher 
would like to apply to them. The dominant profile for such an 
interpretation is the attitude structure of the types. The types are, 
in essence, representations and simplifications of these structures 
of feeling. They are what is ultimately explained by the typology 
which becomes a stand-in or replacement for the attitudes. The 
attitude structure of the types is presented in Figure 2. On the Y 
axis is plotted the group deviation in the number of scale points 
for a particular attitude score. Higher numbers represent an 
orientation toward the political Right and lower numbers 
represent an orientation toward the political Left. From these 
spectra of attitudes, it is possible to begin to interpret the under-
lying sensibility of the group's members. The names in.the figure 
capture the authors' interpretation of the group spirit of the 
members of each type. Specific reasons for these naming choices 
are left to the reader to imagine. Many other names could be ap-
propriate. It is important to say that the most distinctive attitudes 
seem to fall into four classes, race and poverty, corporations and 
optimism, culture and religion, and military and the environ-
ment. Varying combinations of these attributes helped to define 
the groups. 
The attitude profiles are by design the most important dis-
criminators of group composition. Nevertheless, it is helpful to 
flesh out these political types by examining other aspects as well. 
Sensibilities are nurtured in social environments that are, in turn, 
functions of individual backgrounds. Among the background 
characteristics examined here are demography (including race, 
Latino heritage, gender, political registration, and marital status), 
status variables (income in thousands of dollars, education, and 
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age in years), party identification (Republican, Democrat, Inde-
pendent), and geography (South, Urbanicity). In some cases, a 
full picture of the group cannot be developed without the aid of 
these background characteristics. 
Also of interest is the group size. The groups are listed in 
rough order of group size. Weighted estimates of the size of the 
groups are presented in Figure 2. There are four larger groups 
and four smaller groups presented here. While these group size 
numbers are important, experience with the model estimates 
suggests that group size parameters are volatile and actual group 
sizes may be somewhat different than these estimates portray . 
We now know which groups are most alike, but what are the cha-
racteristics that impel them to similarity? 
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Right-wing Populists. The Right Wmg populists are white, 
male, low-income and rural political independents. These Ameri-
cans are doubtful about the international community, suspicious 
of the power of the federal government and of beltway insiders, 
interested in curbing the power of corporations, wary of race-
based equality measures and comfortable with the military. In 
general, they see the economic order as somewhat unfair, but 
take no strong stand on cultural or religious matters. 
Great Society Liberals. The Great Society Liberals are 
overwhelmingly black, low-income, female, urban Democrats. 
This group is the strongest critic of the supposed American meri-
tocracy. They are strong proponents of race based policies as 
well as of anti poverty measures. They do not believe that oppor-
tunity is fairly distributed, are critical of corporate power and are 
among the most pessimistic of Americans. On cultural matters 
they tend toward the Right, but take no strong position on the 
military or the environment. 
Liberal Drifters. The Liberal Drifters are young, unmarried 
unregistered, suburban hard-core independents. They are drifters 
because they seem uncommitted to any of the society's major 
institutions. One imagines the liberal drifter reading Kurt Vonne-
gut and dismissing older bases of commitment as nothing more 
than "granfalloons." Nevertheless, Liberal Drifters feel strongly 
about culture, religion and the military on which they take a hard 
Left position. They are supportive of environmental controls and 
internationalism, but are center-right on race, poverty and federal 
authority issues. While they seem not be believe they are mod-
erate in their skepticism and are not particularly distrustful of 
lawmakers or corporations and seem to have some faith in indi-
vidual opportunity. 
Opportunity Liberals. The Opportunity Liberals have more 
Latinos and women than one would expect, are of modest means 
and lean strongly Democratic. These Americans have faith in the 
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American system which extends to the establishment of a strong 
national government with active powers. In fact, it is only this 
strong commitment to federal authority and environmental regu-
lation that qualifies them as liberal at all. An opportunity liberal 
has great trust in Washington lawmakers, a strong dose of reli-
gious piety, optimism and faith in the meritocracy and a distaste 
for race based policy. These citizens are moderate on issues re-
garding the military and corporations as well as on cultural is-
sues in general. 
Business Class. Members of the Business Class are extreme-
ly wealthy, white men, who are politically active Republicans. 
What most defines the business class is a fascination with power, 
whether it talces the form in the corporation or the military. Their 
optimism in the American system seems to match this lust for 
authority. The business class trusts the Washington establishment 
over which it has some control and is uncomfortable with mi-
nimal standards of human decency, which often prove to be ex-
pensive. While the group is more progressive in it cultural and 
religious values than other members of the Right, it demonstrates 
the strongest commitment to the international community of any 
group on the Right. This is probably commensurate with a vision 
of global opportunity shared by members of this group. 
Religious Right. The Religious Right are older married folk 
from southern rural areas who tend to identify as Republican . If 
there is one issue that defines this group, it is tradition and group 
members see themselves as its defenders. Whether it is god or 
the family, members of this group are the farthest right of the 
eight. The Religious Right is somewhat pessimistic about Ameri-
ca for what one supposes are concerns about "the culture" or 
"the liberal establishment," and the major institutions of that cul-
ture are held in generally low esteem. The Religious Right are 
mildly anti-government, anti-corporate, anti-World, and anti-
Washington. They tend to side with the Right in their opposition 
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to programs concerned with Race, Poverty and the Environment 
as well. 
Hard Right. The Hard Right are well-off, married men, who 
identify exclusively as Republicans, are registered in extreme 
numbers who tend not to live in cities. The hard right is one of 
the two clearly ideological groups in the electorate. On almost 
every issue they are in agreement with the strong right position. 
It is only on matters of religion and the international community 
that they take a moderate stand. The most extreme opposition is 
reserved for attitudes on the environment where this group is 
most out of step with the mainstream. If they ever side with the 
Left, it is in its critique of the Washington establishment of insu-
lated and vested interests . One assumes that these are what they 
see as left-wing special interests. 
Progressives . The counter-balance to the Hard Right are the 
Progressives. The Progressives are well-off, northern metro-area 
residents who marry in fewer numbers than average and who are 
committed Democrats. The profile of these Americans is very 
nearly the mirror image of the former group, but emphases differ. 
While the Hard Right stresses the environment, personal respon-
sibility and abusive government, the Progressives stress the in-
ternational community, and moral freedom. The progressives are 
quite moderate on the issue of corporate power and are fairly 
optimistic about America and its meritocracy. Progressives are 
even more committed to civil right and the war on poverty than 
are the Great Society Liberals and are the most anti-war and se-
cular group of the bunch . 
Even though the election of 2000 was over a year away from 
this survey, many respondents had developed voting intensions. 
Much of what appears here is obvious from the demographic 
descriptions, but there are a few surprises. The two groups that 
were most on the fence were the Right-wing Populists and the 
Liberal Drifters. The "Other" and "Don't Know" responses were 
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particularly high in those groups. Subsequent analysis of 2000 
data suggests that these groups broke for Buchanan and Nader 
respectively in disproportionate numbers. Also of note is the fact 
proven reasonable by subsequent history that the four largest 
groups had the least well defined vote intentions in October 
1999. While the heavily minority Great Society Liberals were 
leaning Democratic the rest were preparing to be erratic. The 
most certain of all of the groups were the progressives who most 
likely went on to combat the anti-corporate Nader movement in 
the last weeks of the campaign of 2000. 
VISUALIZING COALITIONS 
While it is possible to imagine how these groups might be 
related one to another and how they might combine under certain 
ideological conditions to fonn coalitions of voters. In order to 
visualize potential coalitions we have projected the classes into a 
two dimensional space using the ALSCAL multidimensional 
scaling technique on a matrix of differences between the eight 
groups. 
To produce such a solution, we first generated a matrix of 
distance measures between the eight groups, measured as the 
Euclidian distance between groups in a twelve dimensional atti-
tude space. This simply means that the distance between groups 
is measured as a function of the square of the distance between 
average group ratings on each of the twelve attitudes. Groups 
with similar attitudes will be close on such a scale and those with 
different attitudes will be distant. For purposes of estimation, the 
measurement level was treated as ordinal to improve the repre-
sentation and the solution was limited to two dimensions for 
purposes of reliable estimation. The solution for the attitude 
proximities is presented in a biplot in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2 projects the eight latent groups into space with coordi-
nates equal to their values in the two-dimensional MDS solution. 
These are represented in capital letters in the figure. In addition, 
each of the twelve attitude vectors have been mapped into the 
space by calculating the projection of each vector along the two 
MDS dimensions. The length of each vector varies as a function 
of the multiple correlation of the attitude item with MDS dimen-
sions. 
In Figure 2 we can see that the two dimensions are quite dif-
ferent in content. The abscissa seems to embody the main left-
right dimension. On the right extreme is the hard right and on the 
left are the progressives. All six of the other groups fall some-
where in between. One might imagine that all groups right of 
zero are a natural Republican constituency and those left of zero 
are the Democratic constituency. If this is a fair characterization 
then the challenge on the left at the time was to energize the 
lackadaisical liberal drifter group and to appeal to the opportuni-
ty liberals. 
The ordinate dimension separates the privileged classes from 
the various lower status groups, the great society liberals, right 
wing populists and the religious right. Progressives are almost 
exactly moderate on this dimension, but both parties face a chal-
lenge in finding the right balance here. For example, the elites on 
the right are clearly low on this dimension which embraces op-
portunity, corporate power and optimism, but key constituencies, 
like the religious right are high on the dimension. On the left, the 
great society liberals are high on the dimension, progressives are 
moderate and the other two groups are leaning toward the Re-
publican side of the issue. 
By drawing separating lines through this space, one can en-
vision a variety of possible attitude coalitions that could be gen-
erated. One example is to respect only the first dimension that 
separates the four groups on the left from the four groups on the 
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right. In this view a right coalition brings together two populist 
groups and one business group to form its center. The hard right 
stands outside for its inordinate opposition to the environment, 
federal authority and poverty progran1S. These four groups 
amount to less than 4 7% of the electorate. This leaves the re-
maining 53% to the left coalition of liberal drifters, opportunity 
liberals , great society liberals and progressives. Unfortunately 
for the left coalition, one of its member groups, liberal drifters, is 
completely w1engaged from politics and is unlikely to vote and 
another, opportunity liberals, though mobilized are only weakly 
attached to the Democrats. The only comparable weak attach-
ment on the right is among the right-wing populists whose ten-
dency towards racism, national interests and jingoism probably 
left them susceptible to conversion with Bush's tough rhetoric 
and subsequently the events of September 11, 2001. It is not sur-
prising that in this environment, the country faced one of its 
closest elections in 2000. 
Another way to envision the natural coalitions in the above 
results is to separate those on the top of the graph from those on 
the bottom. Then Great society liberals, right-wing populists and 
the religious right square off on progressives, liberal drifters, 
opportunity liberals, the business class and the hard right. What 
unites these otherwise distinct groups is a populist appeal in view 
of their left leaning attitudes on corporate power, availability of 
opportunity, and beltway insiders. Certainly no stable coalition 
can be made of such groups, but one can imagine that some of 
the volatility in recent elections comes down to this cross cutting 
tension. An interesting wrinkle is to confine the opposition on 
this dimension to the business class, opportunity liberals and lib-
eral drifters, while excluding the extremist progressives and hard 
right groups. This produces the divide between three lower status 
and geographically marginalized groups and three groups whose 
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status and geography are more middle class in nature. Many oth-
er possibilities are reasonable as well. 
DISCUSSION 
In the preceding paper, we have developed a new political 
typology of the American electorate in October 1999 using a 
model-based estimation procedure called latent class/latent pro-
file analysis. This approach bears a strong resemblance to factor 
analysis and can be understood as the discrete alternative to that 
method designed for modeling continuous latent variables. The 
eight types that were discovered in these data have quite distinc-
tive attitude profiles, which when combined with demographic, 
political, social status and geographic data paint an interesting 
and novel picture of the American public. Many of the findings 
presented here are largely anticipated, others are perhaps less so. 
While any typology drawn from data can be fertile ground 
for the imagination of pundits and scholars alike, imagination 
will be better served if the types are generated with the best and 
most reliable tools possible. Latent Class methods offer one of 
the best avenues toward the discrete classification of unobserva-
ble political states. The models presented here are merely an ex-
ample of what could be done with them. 
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APPENDIXA 
PEW TYPOLOGY QUESTI ONS 
I'm going to read you some pairs of statements that will help us 
understand how you feel about a number of things. As I read each pair, 
tell me whether the FIRST statement or the SECOND statement comes 
closer to your own views-even if neither is exactly right. The first pair 
is . .. [READ AND ROTATE]. (AFTER CHOICE IS MADE, PROBE : 
Do you feel STRONGLY about that, or not?] 
• Government is almost always wasteful and inefficient OR 
Government often does a better job than people give it credit 
for {6-97} 
• Government regulation of business is necessary to protect the 
public interest OR Government regulation of business usually 
does more harm than good {10-96} 
• Poor people today have it easy because they can get 
government benefits without doing anything in return OR 
Poor people have hard lives because government benefits don't 
go far enough to help them live decently {6-97} 
• The government should do more to help needy Americans, 
even if it means going deeper into debt OR The government 
today can't afford to do much more to help the needy { 10-96} 
• The position of blacks in American society has improved in 
recent years OR There hasn't been much real progress for 
blacks in recent years {6-97} 
• Racial discrimination is the main reason why many black 
people can't get ahead these days OR Blacks who can't get 
ahead in this country are mostly responsible for their own 
condition { 10-97} 
• Immigrants today strengthen our country because of their hard 
work and talents OR Immigrants today are a burden on our 
country because they take our jobs, housing and health care 
{ I 0-97 } 
VOL. 36 2008 
130 SIMMONS & SIMMONS 
• Other countries generally treat the United States about as 
fairly as we treat them OR Other countries often take unfair 
advantage of the United States {7-94} 
• The best way to ensure peace is through military strength OR 
Good diplomacy is the best way to ensure peace {10-96} 
• We should all be willing to fight for our country, whether it is 
right or wrong OR It's acceptable to refuse to fight in a war 
you believe is morally wrong {10-96} 
• Most people who want to get ahead can make it if they're 
willing to work hard OR Hard work and determination are no 
guarantee of success for most people {7-94} 
• Success in life is pretty much determined by forces outside of 
our control OR Everyone has it in their own power to succeed 
{7-94} 
• Too much power is concentrated in the hands of a few large 
companies OR The largest companies do NOT have too much 
power {10-96} 
• Business corporations make too much profit OR Most 
corporations make a fair and reasonable amount of profit {6-
97} 
• Elected officials in Washington lose touch with the people 
pretty quickly OR Elected officials in Washington try hard to 
stay in touch with voters back home {10-96} 
• Most elected officials care what people like me think OR Most 
elected officials don 't care what people like me think {6-97} 
Now I'm going to read you some more pairs of statements . As I read 
each pair, tell me whether the FIRST statement or the SECOND 
statement comes closer to your own views-even if neither is exactly 
right. The first pair is ... (READ AND ROTATE) (AFTER CHOICE IS 
MADE, PROBE : Do you feel STRONGLY about that, or not?) 
• This country should do whatever it takes to protect the 
environment OR This country has gone too far in its efforts to 
protect the environment {10-96} 
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• Stricter environmental laws and regulations cost too many 
jobs and hurt the economy OR Stricter environmental laws 
and regulations are worth the cost {10-96} 
• There are no real limits to growth in this country today OR 
People in this country should learn to live with less {7-94} 
• As Americans , we can always find ways to solve our problems 
and get what we want OR This country can't solve many of its 
important problems {7-94} 
• Homosexuality is a way of life that should be accepted by 
society OR Homosexuality is a way of life that should be 
discouraged by society { 10-97} 
• Books that contain dangerous ideas should be banned from 
public school libraries OR Public school libraries should be 
allowed to carry any books they want {6-97} 
• Religion is a very important part ofmy life OR Religion is not 
that important to me {new} 
• We will all be called before God to answer for our sins OR I 
don't believe we will have to answer for our sins before God 
{6-97, modified } 
• I'm generally satisfied with the way things are going for me 
financially OR I'm not very satisfied with my financial 
situation { 1 0-96} 
• I often don 't have enough money to make ends meet OR 
Paying the bills is generally not a problem for me {7-94} 
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